Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been mostly hailed as a victory, Islamic states still regard its application of international criminal-law norms with scepticism.
INTRODUCTION
Numerous scholars have debated the formation, functioning, and practice of the International Criminal Court (ICC). One of the most contentious of these debates is on the issue of the general principles of law that can be applied by the Court in various cases. During the Rome negotiations, Islamic states supported the existence of an international criminal-justice institution. However, they also viewed it with suspicion and showed reluctance in ratifying the statute, because of the selectivity of the Court in the application of principles of criminal law. 2 It has been noted by scholars that there is a tendency towards viewing Islamic law as a static or non-progressive legal system, whose main principles are derived from religious texts. 3 Most Western scholarly debates centre on Islamic criminal law on a basic level without an in-depth grasp of the subject. This has been thought to be due to a lacuna in the available English literature on Islamic criminal law that 'cries to be filled'. 4 It has also been argued that it is almost impossible for Islamic law to be compared to the Western legal system, because the legal systems of almost all Islamic states are based on the principles of Shari'a, making the path to the creation of a dialogue between Islamic law and international institutions virtually non-progressive. 5 The aim of this paper is to find out whether it is viable for the ICC to adopt principles of international criminal law from the Islamic legal system. As it is obviously impossible to cover every aspect of Islamic law and its counterpart in the ICC Statute, the scope of this paper is limited to some fundamental principles of Islamic criminal law and its compatibility with international criminal-law principles, namely the principle of legality, the presumption of innocence, the concept of mens rea, and the standards used by Muslim jurists for determining intention in murder cases. Other general defences such as duress and superior orders are also included in this paper.
To achieve its purpose, the second and third parts of this paper examine in detail the sources of Islamic law, categories of crimes, the leading schools of Islamic thought (madh¯ahib), and Islamic legal maxims (al-Qaw¯a'id al-Fiqh¯ıyah).
ISLAMIC LAW (SHARI'A)
Islamic law (Shari'a) has its roots deeply embedded in the political, legal, and social aspects of all Islamic states and it is the governing factor of all Islamic nations. 6 It is often described by both Muslims and Orientalists as the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life -the core and kernel of Islam itself. 7 Other commentators deem this an exaggeration and do not believe Islam was meant to be as much of a law-based religion as it has often been made out to be. 8 In any case, Islamic law, one of the recognized legal systems of the world, 9 is a particularly instructive example of a 'sacred law' and differs from other systems so significantly that its study is indispensable in order to appreciate adequately the full range of possible legal phenomena. 10 Islamic law, like Roman law, used to be a 'jurist law', in the sense that it was a product of neither legislative authority nor case law, but a creation of the classical jurists, who elaborated on the sacred texts. 11 However, with the first codifications in the mid-nineteenth century, Islamic law became 'statutory law', promulgated by a national territorial legislature. 12 It is no secret that most Islamic nations are viewed as being non-progressive, especially with respect to their national legal systems and implementation of criminal laws. 13 On the other hand, the Islamic states view the West and East as being unethical, immoral, and unduly biased towards the religious, cultural, and political aspects of Islam itself.
their laws are to be subject to the Shari'a; therefore, their constitutional courts decide on whether a given law is in conformity with the Shari'a and can also review the manner in which other national courts interpret and apply the laws to ensure conformity. 18 The third category of states proclaims the direct applicability of the Shari'a. According to one commentator, the majority of Muslim states fall between the two poles of 'purist' Saudi Arabia and 'secular' Turkey. 19 Most states have been selective in determining which Shari'a rules apply to their national legislations. 20 As a consequence of colonialism and the adoption of Western codes, Shari'a was abolished in the criminal law of some Muslim countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but has made a comeback in recent years, with countries like Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, and Muslim-dominated northern states of Nigeria reintroducing it in place of Western criminal codes. 
Sources of Islamic law: Shari'a and Fiqh
Islam is a way of life akin to a system that regulates the believer's life and thoughts in line with a certain set of rules. 22 The term 'Islamic law' covers the entire system of law and jurisprudence associated with the religion of Islam. It can be divided into two parts, namely the primary sources of law (Shari'a in the strict legal sense) and the subordinate sources of law with the methodology used to deduce and apply the law (Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh).
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Shari'a literally means 'the pathway' 24 and, in its original usage, it meant the road to the watering place or path leading to the water, that is, the way to the source of life. 25 It rules and regulates all public and private behaviour as well as legal aspects. 26 The word Shari'a occurs once in the Qur'¯an: 'Thus we put you on the right way [shar¯ı'atan] of religion. So follow it and follow not the whimsical desire (haw¯a) of those who have no knowledge' (Qur'¯an, 45:18).
Shari'a is derived directly from the Qur'¯an and the Sunnah, which are considered by Muslims to be of divine revelation and thus create the immutable part of Islamic law, while fiqh is mainly the product of human reason. 'Muslim jurists throughout history have not been concerned with establishing a particular field or science or even theory -to them the divine sources are comprehensive enough to encompass any possible human action, conduct or transaction.' 27 However, it is important to mention that in contrast to the belief of the Sunni, the Shi'a believe that divine revelation continued to be transmitted after the Prophet's death to the line of their recognized religious leaders (imams). 28 They thus consider as part of the divine revelation the pronouncements of their imams, whom they believe infallible. 29 2.2.1. Qur'¯an The Qur'¯an is considered by Muslims to be the embodiment of the words of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad through Angel Gabriel. It is the chief source of Islamic law and the root of all other sources. 30 However, it is far from being a textbook of jurisprudence and is rather a book of guidance on all aspects of the life of every Muslim: 31 ' We have sent down to thee the Book explaining all things, a Guide, a Mercy, and Glad Tidings to Muslims' (Qur'¯an, 16:89).
The Qur'¯an consists of more than 6000 verses (ayat). 32 Jurists differ on the number of verses that are of legal subject matter, as they use different methods of classification for determining what constitutes a legal verse -estimates range from 80 up to 800 verses. 33 The legal verses are not accumulated in their own separate chapter (sura), but may occur alongside verses about belief, general behaviour, the nature of existence, or the history of bygone peoples. A particular judgment may occur on a number of different occasions and in different styles to deepen and broaden the understanding of the believer while reminding him of the rule.
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The Qur'¯an is an indivisible whole and a guide that must be accepted and followed in its entirety. 35 It was revealed, a few verses at a time, over a period of 23 years, ending with the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE. To properly understand its legislation, one has to take into consideration the Sunnah as well as the circumstances and the context of the time of the revelation.
Sunnah
According to the common understanding of Muslims, the second sources of Islamic law are the sayings and practice of the Prophet Muhammad or the Sunnah, collected in had¯ıths. 36 While the Qur'¯an is believed to be of manifest revelation -that is, that the very words of God were conveyed to the Prophet Muhammad by the Angel Gabrielthe Sunnah falls into the category of internal revelation, that is, it is believed that God inspired Muhammad and the latter conveyed the concepts in his own words.
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The Sunnah is complementary to the Qur'¯an as a source for knowing the divine will, which is explicitly stated in the Qur'¯an itself: 'And what the 28 This concept of exerting one's reasoning in determining a matter of law is called ijtihad and it is the essence of¯us¯ul al-fiqh, a legal method of ranking the sources of law, their interaction, interpretation, and application. 41 The result of this method is fiqh, which literally means human understanding and knowledge in deducing and applying the prescriptions of the Shari'a in real or hypothetical cases. 42 As such, it does not command the same authority as does the Shari'a and it is the subject of different Sunni and Shi'a scholarly and methodological approaches. 43 In the formative period of Islamic law, the science of¯us¯ul al-fiqh did not yet exist as a separate branch of intellectual endeavour and no fixed hierarchy of sources was adopted. 44 Later, however, it became almost universally recognized that the Qur'¯an has primacy over the Sunnah, followed by the two main proofs of law attained through human reasoning, namely ijm¯a' and qiyas.
Consensus by collective reasoning (ijm¯a')
. When the Qur'¯an and the Sunnah do not provide an answer on an issue, learned jurists are to reach a consensus of opinion (ijm¯a') -a practice established by the companions of the Prophet (Sahaba).
45 Ijm¯a' is a rational proof of Shari'a and, because of its binding nature, it requires that the 38 El-Awa, supra note 31, at 147. consensus be absolute and universal; however, in practice, it has often been claimed also for rulings on which only a majority consensus existed. 
Analogical deduction by individual reasoning (qiyas).
47 Qiyas is the extension of Shari'a value or ruling from an original case to a new case, not found in the Qur'¯an, the Sunnah, or a definite ijm¯a', because the new case has the same effective cause as the original one. 48 An example of qiyas is the extension of the prohibition of wine to a prohibition of any drug that causes intoxication, because the prevention of the latter is the effective purpose of the original prohibition. 49 Other methods include istihs¯an (equity in Islamic law), maslahah mursalah (considerations of public interest), 'urf (custom), istish¯ab (presumption of continuity), and ijtih¯ad (personal reasoning). 
Categories of crime in Islamic criminal law
In Islamic law, offences have been divided into three categories according to complex criteria that combine the gravity of the penalty prescribed, the manner and the method used in incriminating and punishing, and the nature of the interest affected by the prohibited act.
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The first category is hud¯ud crimes. These crimes are penalized by the community and punishable by fixed penalties as required in the Qur'¯an and the Sunnah.
52 Both crime and punishment are precisely determined with some flexibility for the judge, depending upon the intent of the accused and the quality of the evidence. 53 Mostly, there are seven recognized hud¯ud crimes: ridda (apostasy); baghi (transgression); sariqa (theft); haraba (highway robbery); zena (illicit sexual relationship); qadhf (slander); and shorb al-khamr (drinking alcohol). 54 It has been argued that these matters cover the most vital areas of collective life (in the following order of priority: religion, life, family, intellect, wealth) 55 and require collective commitment to these values as law. 56 In these offences, it is the notion of Man's obligation to God rather than to his fellow man that predominates. 57 The state owes the right to Allah to implement the hud¯ud.
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Opinions vary on which crimes are to be considered hud¯ud. For the Maliki school of law, there are two different sets of hud¯ud offences. Mawardi (Shafi'i school) claims 46 Ibid., at 228-9. 47 'Refutations of the validity of qiyas are to be found in Imami Shi ' 59 The second category consists of qis¯as and diyya crimes. In Islamic law, the punishment prescribed for murder and the infliction of injury is named qis¯as, that is, inflicting on the culprit an injury exactly equal to the injury he/she inflicted upon his/her victim. The right to demand retribution or compensation lies with the victim or, in cases of homicide, the victim's next of kin. 60 Sometimes, the relationship between this person and the offender can prevent retaliation. 61 Qis¯as and diyya crimes fall into two categories: homicide and battery. 62 These crimes are thus treated in Islamic law as private, not public, offences. 63 The third category of crimes in Islamic law is called ta'azir crimes. These crimes are punishable by penalties left to the discretion of the ruler or the judge (qadi). They are not specified by the Qur'¯an or Sunnah; any act that infringes private or community interests of the public order can be subject to ta'azir. 64 It is the duty of public authorities to lay down rules penalizing such conduct. These rules must, however, draw their inspiration from the Shari'a. 65 An example of a ta'azir crime is the trafficking of persons. It is not defined in the Qur'¯an or the Sunnah but it constitutes a clear violation of the right to personal security, one of the five essentials of Islam. 66 Ta'azir is used for three types of cases:
1. Criminal acts which must by their very nature be sanctioned by penalties which relate to hud¯ud, for example attempted adultery, illicit cohabitation, or simple robbery; 2. Criminal acts normally punished by hud¯ud, but where by reason of doubt, for procedural reasons, or because of the situation of the accused, the hud¯ud punishment is replaced by ta'azir; 3. All acts under the provisions of the law, which are not punished by hud¯ud. 
The leading schools of law (madh¯ahib)
Scholars tracing their doctrine to the same early authority regarded themselves as followers of the same school. Early interest in law evolved where men learned in the Qur'¯an began discussions of legal issues and assumed the role of teachers. 68 At first, students rarely restricted themselves to one teacher and it only became the normative practice in the second half of the ninth century for jurists to adopt a single doctrine. 69 When prominent jurists 70 began to have loyal followers who would apply exclusively their doctrine in courts of law, the so-called 'personal schools' emerged and only a few of these leaders were raised to the level of founder of a 'doctrinal school', what is referred to in Islamic law as the madhh¯ab. 71 When they emerged, the doctrinal schools did not remain limited to the individual doctrine of a single jurist, but possessed a cumulative doctrine in which the legal opinions of the leading jurists were, at best, primi inter pares.
72
The four Sunni schools are the Hanafi, named after Imam Abu Hanifa, the Maliki, named after Imam Malik, the Shafe'i, named after Imam Al Shafe'i, and the Hanbali, named after Imam Ibn Hanbal. Out of these schools, the Hanafi school was geographically the most widespread and, for much of Islamic history, the most politically puissant. The Shi'a schools are the Twelvers, the Isma'ili, and the Zaydi.
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Out of these, the Twelvers are the best known and have the largest percentage in Iran and Iraq.
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It is hard to find consensus among the various schools and sub-schools; however, some consensus can be found among the four Sunni schools and some consensus among the four Shi'a schools. The difference in the rules for interpreting the Qur'¯an is the fundamental element that separates the madh¯ahib from one another. 75 While there is no question that the Qur'¯an is the first source of the Shari'a, followed by the Sunnah, there are differences among the schools as to the ranking of the other sources of law.
In order to create greater legal certainty, rulers could direct the judge (qadi) they appointed to follow one school. 76 This was the practice of Ottoman sultans, while Saudi kings left their qadi totally free in choosing the madhh¯ab and opinions for deciding cases, as there is a strong sense of independence among the religious scholars staffing the courts, based on their view that the realm of the fiqh is their prerogative and the state should not interfere. 77 While, today, there is a general understanding in Islamic republics that the law has to comply with the Shari'a, the concurrence of legislation with the whole body of Islamic law, including Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), and the doctrine of a particular school of Islamic law is not always included. 78 An example can be derived from the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which states that 'All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah'. Similarly, the Afghanistan Constitution declares that 'no 69 84 (an act does not make a person guilty unless his mind is guilty) had become well ingrained in the common law.
'Legal maxims' (al-qaw¯a'id al-fiqh¯ıyah) is a term applied to a particular science in Islamic jurisprudence. Islamic legal maxims, similar to their Western counterparts, are theoretical abstractions in the form, usually, of short epithetic statements that are expressive of the nature and sources of Islamic law and encompass general rules in cases that fall under their subject. 85 They are different from¯us¯ul al-fiqh (roots and sources of Islamic jurisprudence) in that the maxims are based on the fiqh itself and represent rules and principles that are derived from the reading of the detailed rules of fiqh on various themes. 86 One of the main functions of the Islamic legal maxims is to depict the general picture of goals and objectives of the Islamic law (maq¯asid al-Shar¯ı'ah). 87 Legal maxims aid judges in comprehending the basic doctrines of Islamic law on any contentious issue. For instance, the Islamic legal maxim that calls upon judges to avoid imposing hud¯ud and other sanctions when beset by doubts as to the scope of the law or the sufficiency of the evidence is frequently referenced and applied by judges of the Abu Dhabi Supreme Court of the United Arab Emirates. 90 It has been noted that 'exploring this opportunity would also give scholars, judges and jurists of Islamic law the ability to deliver sound and just legal judgments'.
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It is difficult to trace the precise dates for the emergence of the legal maxims (al-qaw¯a'id al-fiqh¯ıyah) as a distinctive genre of roots of Islamic jurisprudence (¯us¯ul al-fiqh). Suffice to say that al-qaw¯a'id al-fiqh¯ıyah has gone through three stages of development. 92 The first stage can be traced back to the seventh century (610-632) as the Prophet of Islam was endowed with the use of precise yet comprehensive and inclusive expressions (jaw¯ami' al-kalim). 93 Despite the fact that the term qaw¯a'id (plural of qa'idah) was not explicitly mentioned in the expressions of the Prophet, the prophetic had¯ıths are full of expressions of legal maxims. For instance, the had¯ıth l¯a darar wal¯a dir¯ar ('let there be no infliction of harm nor its reciprocation'); innam¯a al-a'm¯al bil-niyy¯at ('acts are valued in accordance with their underlying intentions'); and al-bayyinah 'al¯a al-mudda'¯ı wa al-yam¯ın 'al¯a man ankar ('the burden of proof is on the claimant and the oath is on the one who denies') are a few of those prophetic had¯ıths that emerged as Islamic legal maxims.
The second stage at which al-qaw¯a'id al-fiqh¯ıyah began to gain popularity was in the middle of the fourth century of Hijrah (ninth century AD) and beyond when the idea of imitation (al-taql¯ıd) emerged and the spirit of independent reasoning (ijtih¯ad) 94 was on the edge of extinction. 95 At this stage, legal maxims became recognized as a distinct subject from us¯ul al-fiqh. 96 The first visible work on Islamic legal maxims, 97 This was followed by other significant contributions by jurists from other madh¯ahib (legal schools), namely the Shafe'i's, the Hanbali, and the Maliki schools. 98 The Islamic legal maxims reach the stage of maturity around the thirteenth century AH/eighteenth century AD. According to one commentator, 'one of the distinctive features of this stage is the establishment of maxims as a separate science in Islamic jurisprudence, while at the same time the formula of their codification was standardized'.
99
The Mejell-i Ahkam Adliyye, an Islamic law code written by a group of Turkish scholars in the late nineteenth century, is said to present the most advanced stage in the compilation of the Islamic legal maxims.
Islamic legal maxims are divided into two types. The first are those that reiterate the Qur'¯an and the Sunnah, whereas the second are those formulated by the jurists.
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The former carry greater authority than the latter. The most expansive collection of legal maxims is known as al-qaw¯a'id al-fiqh¯ıyah al-asl¯ıyah or al-qaw¯a'id al-fiqh¯ıyah al-kull¯ıyah ('the normative/basic legal maxims'). This kind of maxim stands as the pillars of us¯ul al-fiqh; they could be applied broadly to the entire corpus of Islamic jurisprudence; each of these maxims has supplementary maxims of a more specified scope;and thereisconsensusamongthelegalschoolsover them.
101 Thefivegenerally agreed-upon maxims are as follows: (i) al-um¯ur bi-maq¯asidh¯a ('acts are judged by their goals and purposes'); (ii) al-yaq¯ın l¯a yaz¯alu bil-shak ('certainty is not overruled by doubt'); (iii) al-mashaqqatu tajlib al-tays¯ır ('hardship begets facility'); (iv) al-dararu yuz¯al ('harm must be eliminated'); and (v) al-'¯adatu muuhakamatun ('custom is the basis of judgment').
The maxim 'certainty is not overruled by doubt' has several sub-maxims, one of which reads 'knowledge that is based on certainty is to be differentiated from manifest knowledge that is based on probability' (yufarraqu bayn al-cilmi idh¯a thabata zahir¯an we baynahu idh¯a thabata yaq¯ınan). Two examples are illustrative in this regard:
When the judge adjudicates on the basis of certainty, but later it appears that he might have erred in his judgment, if his initial decision is based on clear text and consensus, it would not be subjected to review on the basis of a mere probability.
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This maxim also applies where a: missing person (mafq¯ud) of unknown whereabouts is presumed to be alive, as this is the certainty that is known about him before his disappearance. The certainty here shall prevail and no claim of his death would validate distribution of his assets among his heirs until his death is proven by clear evidence. A doubtful claim of his death is thus not allowed to overrule what is deemed to be certain. 103 
PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND NON-RETROACTIVITY
One of the rare provisions set out as a non-derogable norm in all of the major human rights instruments is the nullum crimen sine lege rule. 104 Article 22 of the ICC Statute confirms the core prohibition of the retroactive application of the criminal law together with the other two major corollaries of this prohibition, namely the rule of strict construction and the requirement of in dubio pro reo. 105 The prohibitions of retroactive offences together with the prohibition of retroactive penalties, nulla poena sine lege, 106 form the 'principle of legality'. In Islamic law, there is no place for arbitrary rule by a single individual or a group. 107 In fact, long before the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which, in 1789, first proclaimed the legality principle in Western law, the Islamic system of criminal justice operated on an implicit principle of legality. 108 Evidence of this principle can be found in the following Qur'¯anic verses:
Nor would We visit with our wrath until we had sent a messenger (to give warning). Islamic law includes a number of legal maxims that complement this principle, such as: 'the conduct of reasonable men (or the dictate of reason) alone is of no consequence without the support of a legal text', which means that no conduct can be declared forbidden (har¯am) on the ground of reason alone or on the ground of the act of reasonable men; rather, a legal text is necessary. 109 Another maxim declares that 'permissibility is the original norm' (al-asl, fi'l-ashy¯a' al-ib¯ahah), which implies that all things are permissible unless the law has declared them otherwise. 110 Shari'a also establishes the rule of non-retroactivity, unless it is in favour of the accused: 111 forgiven them; but if they persist, the punishment of those before them is already (a matter of warning for them)' (Qur'¯an, 8:38) .
This principle is also mirrored in the tradition of the Prophet. When 'Amr b. al-'Ass embraced Islam, he pledged allegiance to the Prophet and asked whether he would be held accountable for his previous transgressions. To this, the Prophet replied: 'Did you not know, O'Amr, that Islam obliterates that which took place before it?' 112 Similarly, the Prophet refrained from punishing crimes of blood or acts of usury that had taken place prior to Islam:
Any blood-guilt traced back to the period of ignorance should be disregarded, and I begin with that of al-Harith ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib; the usury practised during that period has also been erased starting with that of my uncle, al-'Abbas ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib. 113 Hud¯ud crimes are firmly based on the principle of legality, as the crimes themselves, as well as the punishments, are precisely determined in the Qur'¯an or the Sunnah. Qis¯as crimes are bound to specific procedures and appropriate penalties in the process of retribution and compensation and thus also show their basis in the principle of legality. 114 More problematic are ta'azir crimes, which, according to some schools of thought, give very broad discretionary powers to the khalifa (ruler) and to the qadi (judge) regarding what they punish and how. 115 While ta'azir crimes are, for that reason, viewed by Western scholars as clearly violating the principle of legality, 116 Muslim scholars have mostly defended the wide discretion given to the judges, claiming that this is merely a safeguard that serves to balance the principle of legality and thus avoid the problem of its potential inflexibility. 117 The conclusion of this author is that there is nothing in the primary sources that would allow for ta'azir crimes to be exempt from the principle of legality. 118 Furthermore, to arbitrarily punish under ta'azir those hud¯ud offences that do not meet their procedural requirements amounts to nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the Shari'a rule.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The provision on presumption of innocence as enshrined in Article 66 of the ICC Statute is threefold and its mechanics have been best illustrated by the European Court of Human Rights in Barber´a v. Spain:
It requires, inter alia, that when carrying out their duties, (1) the members of a court should not start with the preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offence charged; (2) the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and (3) any doubt should benefit the accused.
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Under Islamic law, no one is guilty of a crime unless his guilt is proved through lawful evidence. 120 One of the sub-maxims of the maxim 'certainty is not overruled by doubt' is the maxim that reads: 'The norm [of Shar¯ı'ah] is that of non-liability' (al-aslu bar¯a'at al-dhimmah). The Prophet is reported to have said 'everyone is born inherently pure'. 121 According to the legal principle of istishˆab, recognized by the Shafi'i and Hanbali schools, there is a presumption of continuation of a certain state, until the contrary is established by evidence.
122 Therefore, an accused person is considered innocent until the contrary is proven. In the words of Kamali, 'to attribute guilt to anyone is treated as doubtful. Certainty can . . . only be overruled by certainty, not by doubt'. 123 The Prophet is reported to have said:
The burden of proof is on him who makes the claim, whereas the oath [denying the charge] is on him who denies;
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Had Men been believed only according to their allegations, some persons would have claimed the blood and properties belonging to others, but the accuser is bound to present positive proof; 125 and Avoid condemning the Muslim to hud¯ud whenever you can, and when you can find a way out for the Muslim then release him for it. If the Imam errs, it is better that he errs in favour of innocence (pardon) than in favour of guilt (punishment).
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From the latter, hadith jurists have derived the general principle and it is agreed by the four major Sunni schools that doubt (shubhah) also fends off qis¯as. 127 The following case is illustrative in this regard:
During the time of the Muslim polity's fourth caliph 'Al¯ı, Medina's patrol found a man in the town ruins with a blood-stained knife in hand, standing over the corpse of a man who had recently been stabbed to death. When they arrested him, he immediately confessed: 'I killed him.' He was brought before 'Al¯ı, who sentenced him to death for the deed. Before the sentence was carried out, another man hurried forward, telling the executioners not to be hasty. 'Do not kill him. I did it,' he announced. 'Al¯ı turned to the condemned man, incredulously. 'What made you confess to a murder that you did not commit?!' he asked. The man explained that he thought that 'Al¯ı would never take his word over that of the patrolmen who had witnessed a crime scene, he was a butcher who had just finished slaughtering a cow. Immediately afterward, he needed to relieve himself, so entered into the area of the ruins, bloody knife still in hand. Upon return, he came across the dead man, and stood over him in concern. It was then that the petrol arrested him. He figured that he could not plausibly deny having committed the crime of murder. He surrendered himself and confessed to the 'obvious,' deciding to leave the truth of the matter in God's hands. The second man offered a corroborating story. He explained that he was the one who had murdered for money and fled when he heard the sounds of the patrol approaching. On his way out, he passed the butcher on the way in and watched the events previously described unfold. But once the first man was condemned to death, the second man said that he had to step forward, because he did not want the blood of two men on his hands.
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Having realized that the facts surrounding the above case had become doubtful without a fail-safe means to validate one story over the other, the fourth caliph 'Al¯ı released the first man and pardoned the second. 129 The system of proof applicable for hud¯ud and qis¯as makes it very difficult and sometimes almost impossible to prove a crime. 130 On this matter, the Qur'¯an states: 'And those who launch a charge against chaste women and produce not four witnesses (to support their allegation) flog them with eighty stripes and reject their evidence ever after, for such men are wicked transgressors' (Qur'¯an, 24:4). In Shari'a, one of the basic legal maxims agreed upon by Muslim scholars is al-um¯ur bi maq¯asidih¯a, which implies that any action, whether physical or verbal, should be considered and judged according to the intention of the doer. 132 The first element of the maxim, um¯ur (plural for amr), is literally translated as a matter, issue, act, physical or verbal. 133 The second word is al-maq¯asid (plural of maqsad), which literally means willing, the determination to do something for a purpose. 134 Thus, for an act to be punishable, the intention of the perpetrator has to be established. Yet, the general rule in Shari'a is that a man cannot be held responsible for a mere thought. In Islam, a good thought is recorded as an act of piety and a bad thought is not recorded at all. 138 According to Imam Abou Zahra, an eminent scholar, the criminal intent is the intent to act wilfully, premeditatedly, and deliberately, with a complete consent about its intended results. 139 Intentional crimes must meet three conditions: premeditation, a free will to choose a certain course of action, and the knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act. 140 The difference between intentional and unintentional results is in the degree of punishment.
MENS REA
The established jurisprudence of the Supreme Federal Court of the United Arab of Emirates (UAE) recognizes different degrees of mental states other than the one of actual intent. Most notably, the UAE adheres to Malik's school of thought, according to which, in murder cases, it is not a condition sine qua non to prove the intent of murder on the part of the defendant; it is sufficient, however, to prove that the act was carried out with purpose of assault and not for the purpose of amusement or discipline. A practical example is set forth in one of Malik's jurisprudence sources: 'if two people fought intentionally and one of them was killed, retaliation (q¯ısas) should be imposed on the person who survived.' 
Standards used for determining intention in murder cases
Because the intention of a person is difficult to determine, Muslim jurists do not envisage an exploration of the psyche of the killer, or any extensive examination of behaviour patterns or the gradation of the relationship between the killer and the victim. 142 Instead, they consider the objects used in the crimes described by the relative had¯ıths as external standards that are likely to convey the inner working of the offender's mind and thus distinguish between 'amd (intentional) and shibh al-'amd (quasi-intentional).
